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1. Semantic ambiguity and fallacious arguments 
Many advertisements consist of a statement where a metaphor occurs. An 
example is the advertisement proposed by “Vacanze romane” Italian bar and 
restaurant chain: “Coffee is balm for the heart and the spirit”. This sentence 
is clearly false: coffee is not a balm. However its context of use might cause 
it to be perceived as true, or at least plausible. From a literal point of view, it 
is false, but from a non-literal point of view it seems true. This might be the 
reason why metaphor is used in advertising: for its highly persuasive nature. 
In an argument used to persuade someone, a sentence containing a metaphor 
might then facilitate the desired effect. 
Following this intuition, we aim at understanding the effect of metaphor 
in arguments, such as those having the structure of a quaternio terminorum, 
where the nature of the middle term plays a fundamental role in the 
comprehension of the overall argument and might influence its persuasive 
force. Actually, this particular kind of fallacy can be considered in the class 
of the so-called lexical ambiguity fallacies (for another example, cf. Åqvist 
1960). Fallacies of this sort inherit their ambiguity from the terms 
composing them, which can be polysemous in a broad sense, i.e. they may 
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permit several different meanings. Lexically ambiguous arguments are to be 
distinguished from structurally ambiguous ones, which contain no 
polysemic terms, but whose ambiguity stems from the argument syntax 
(Fearnside and Holter 1959).  
Quaternio terminorum is indeed based on the intrinsic ambiguity of the 
middle term, which might have two different meanings. We will discuss 
four main cases of lexical ambiguity of a term: either the terms having two 
different literal meanings (the cases of homonymy and polysemy), or the 
terms having a literal meaning and a non-literal meaning, (the case of 
lexicalized metaphor and live metaphor). How might these cases of 
ambiguity influence the comprehension of a quaternio terminorum? Could 
they change its persuasive effect? In this paper, we aim at discussing in 
detail these four cases in order to understand whether lexical ambiguity 
actually plays a role in quaternio terminorum comprehension. In particular, 
we will try to figure out the ways in which the kind of lexical ambiguity of 
the middle term could influence the overall understanding of an argument 
having the structure of a quaternio terminorum. Indeed, we think that some 
disambiguation processes are required in identifying the meanings of the 
middle term in the two premises, and therefore their overall semantic value, 
i.e. their being true or false. Determining the truth or falsity of the premises 
represents an important step to the comprehension of arguments and we 
expect this might influence the overall understanding of quaternio 
terminorum. 
2. Criteria for lexical ambiguity 
A term is lexically ambiguous if it has more than one meaning. The most 
common form of lexical ambiguity is polysemy, in which a term presents 
one (or more) literal meanings linked by a semantic relation. When the 
different literal meanings of a term have no semantic relation, we run into a 
rarer case of lexical ambiguity: homonymy (Frath 2001, Lyons 1977, Taylor 
1989/2003). Let us propose two examples: 
 
Homonymy 
The term bank has two completely different literal meanings (1) and 
(2): 
financial institution;  
riverside. 
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Polysemy 
The term letter has two different literal meanings (3) and (4), having a 
semantic relation:  
symbol of the alphabet; 
written communication. 
 
Many criteria for homonymy/polysemy distinction have been proposed: 
the most important ones could be considered the etymological, the 
psychological and the translation criterion. Unfortunately, each of these 
criteria suffers from some criticism (Lyons 1977, Nerlich 2003).  
According to the etymological criterion, ambiguity is a mere historical 
accident, randomly causing a superposition of terms. For instance, the origin 
of one meaning of the linguistic form file is from the French word fil, 
meaning folder or box for holding loose papers, whilst the other comes from 
the Old-English word féol, which refers to a tool with roughened surface. 
On the other hand, the meanings of the term letter (“symbol of the alphabet” 
and “written communication”) are polysemous because they share the same 
etymological root (Falkum 2011, Lyons 1977, Taylor 1989/2003). While in 
the case of homonymy the meanings of a term, in general, do not share any 
property, in the case of polysemy a semantic overlap between the two 
meanings can be observed. 
The etymological criterion is a valuable tool in analysing those 
phenomena, however, it should be assumed with some provisos. In fact, 
assuming an etymological perspective tout court would mean assuming a 
degree of subjectivity of the relations among meanings, because it is relative 
to the knowledge of the speakers. For instance, the term cardinal has two 
meanings historically related: 
 
leader of the Roman Catholic Church; 
a songbird.  
 
Nonetheless, it may well be the case that native speakers could ignore 
such a relation and the term cardinal could seem homonymous (Falkum 
2011; Lyons 1977). 
The psychological criterion precisely states that the 
polysemy/homonymy distinction is up to native speakers’ intuitions: if 
native speakers judge a linguistic form as having unrelated semantic 
representations, then such a form is homonymous, whilst if native speakers 
judge a linguistic form as having different but related semantic 
representations, then such a form is polysemous (Cruse 1995, Pinkal 1995). 
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The difficulties with a complete agreement of a psychological criterion 
relate to the fact that it is not easy to identify the role of speakers’ intuitions. 
For instance: there are no clear intuitions on 1) the “causal ancestors” of a 
word and 2) the “new usage” of a word (Lepore and Hawthorne 2011). As 
an example, for a dance, a linguistic community could have 1) performance 
standards of the dance, but also 2) an evolution of that dance, performed in 
different times, and 3) no agreement on what to consider as a new dance. 
After all, as Wittgenstein stated, this is anyway compatible with having an 
image of that dance: “in order to want to say something one must also have 
mastered a language; and yet it is clear that one can want to speak without 
speaking. Just as one can want to dance without dancing. And when we 
think about this, we grasp at the image of dancing, speaking, etc.” 
(Wittgenstein 1953: § 338). 
Finally, the third criterion considers ambiguity as a matter of 
translation: if the translation of a term into a different language obliges one 
to choose among different translation equivalents, or if there is no one-to-
one equivalence in translation (Ervas 2008), then that term is homonymous. 
Indeed, as Kripke noted, ambiguity is usually not preserved in translation: 
“We can ask empirically whether languages are in fact found that contain 
distinct words expressing the allegedly distinct senses [...]. There is no 
reason for the ambiguity to be preserved in languages unrelated to our own” 
(Kripke 1979: 19). For instance, the meanings of the English term bark – 
which denotes either the characteristic abrupt cry of a dog or the outer layer 
of a tree – could be disambiguated in the translation into Italian respectively 
with “latrato” and “corteccia”. The term bark is indeed polysemous, as well 
as the Italian term credenza which can be translated into Spanish with 
“creencia” (when the meaning is “belief”) and with “aparador” (when the 
meaning is “piece of furniture”). 
As with the other criteria, the translation criterion presents some 
drawbacks too (Zwicky and Sadock 1975). Against the claim that 
homonymy can be identified because it forces a choice among different 
equivalents in the translation process, there are also polysemous words 
which are translated into different terms in other languages. Consider, for 
example, the expression: “I like fish”. This could be faithfully translated in 
Spanish in either “Me gusta el pez” (“pez” is a live fish) or “Me gusta el 
pescado” (“pescado” is an already caught fish): the English term fish is 
indeed polysemous and other languages, such as Spanish, can codify subtle 
nuances of meaning not codified in English. The same could be said for 
some Italian polysemous words, such as nipote in the Italian statement “Era 
la nipote di Angiolieri”, which can be translated in French by either “C’était 
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la niéce d’Angiolieri” or “C’était la petite-fille d’Angiolieri”, according to 
the family relationship of the female subject with Angiolieri (Ervas 2012). 
3. Pragmatic processes in lexical ambiguity 
It makes sense to wonder whether the difference between these two kinds of 
lexical ambiguity, homonymy and polysemy, is based on the fact that they 
involve different pragmatic processes which rely on the distinction between 
narrow and broad contexts (Bach 2012, Carston 2002, Perry 1997, 2001, 
Recanati 2004). As regards homonymy, the selection of the relevant 
meaning works by default on the basis of the pre-semantic context, the so-
called narrow context. Conversely, for what concerns polysemy, the 
selection of the relevant meaning involves a process of pragmatic 
enrichment on the basis of the post-semantic context, or the broad context. 
In a narrow context using anaphora, both the meanings of a homonymous 
term, such as bank, would have the effect that “something does not work” as 
in the following sentence: 
 
He put some money in a bank and then he swam to it. 
 
Sentence a. puts together unrelated semantic fields and at best it could 
be interpreted as a joke. The joke is created by the paradox of referring to 
completely different readings of the term, as in case of syntactic ambiguity: 
“One morning I shot an elephant in my pajamas. How he got into my 
pajamas I’ll never know” (Groucho Marx). 
On the other hand, a polysemous term such as window can be used via 
anaphora and can be read in both its meaning (“window of a house” and 
“window on the computer screen”) preserving the impression that the 
overall sentence works in both cases, as in the following sentence: 
 
He opened the window and then went through it. 
 
Indeed, in statement b., a definitely broader context is required to 
understand which meaning of window is relevant, otherwise both readings 
would be equally possible (Frazier and Rayner 1990, Garrod, Freudenthal 
and Boyle 1994). We could interpret this phenomenon as a different form of 
contextual dependence. While homonymy has a finite list of meanings and 
we do not need an extremely broad context to understand the relevant 
meaning used in the sentence, this is not really the case for polysemy. In 
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polysemy, indeed, the word contributes to an indefinite number of other 
meanings, which are the results of the modulation process of such a word 
(Recanati 2004, 2010). In homonymy, the use of context in the selection of 
the relevant meaning is pre-semantic: we need it to choose the relevant 
meaning among the others in the list. In polysemy, the use of context in the 
modulation process is post-semantic, because it involves finer knowledge of 
language and world, as well as subtle nuances of the communicative 
encounter (Simpson 1994). 
The phenomenon of polysemy cannot indeed be solved simply through 
disambiguation. There is a clear gap between what is literally expressible 
and what speakers may need to express, between the encoded concepts and 
the intended ones (Hirst 1987). Modulation is a pragmatic process that fills 
this gap by pragmatically inferring the intended (“ad hoc”) concepts on the 
basis of the encoded concepts “in response to specific expectations of 
relevance raised in specific contexts” (Carston 2002: 322). The adjustment 
that produces the “ad hoc” concepts consists of narrowing or broadening the 
encoded concepts, namely in suppressing the information these concepts 
encode when they are not relevant in the context. In the case of narrowing, 
the semantic field of the encoded concept is reduced to a sub-set, as in the 
following sentence, where “drink” is narrowed down to “drink alcohol”: 
 
I do not like to drink when I have to work. 
 
The speaker clearly does not mean that she does not drink water or non-
alcoholic drinks: this piece of information is then suppressed. In the case of 
broadening, the semantic field of the encoded concept is enlarged to a super-
set, as in the following sentence, where “crazy” is loosened to “strange”: 
 
This guy is crazy. 
 
The speaker clearly does not mean that the guy has a psychiatric disease, but 
that he is a little bit bizarre. This explanation of the explicit meaning of 
sentences challenges the traditional distinction between literal and non-
literal uses of language, as what is considered “literal” is the result of a 
pragmatic process of modulation (Carston 1997, 2002, 2010a). 
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4. Pragmatic processes in metaphor interpretation 
Similar pragmatic processes have been hypothesized in case of non-literal 
language, such as metaphors, where – in a way similar to polysemy – some 
semantic properties of the source (literal) domain are shared with a target 
(non-literal) domain. It has been shown that suppression would be involved 
in both homonymy disambiguation and metaphor interpretation 
(Gernsbacher and Faust 1991). In both cases, a piece of information is 
suppressed, however, in the process of disambiguation the irrelevant 
meaning disappears significantly more quickly, when compared to the 
process of metaphor interpretation, which requires more demanding 
attentional resources to suppress the corresponding literal meaning 
(Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner 2001, Rubio Fernandez 
2007). In homonymy disambiguation, the irrelevant literal meaning indeed 
has no semantic relation with contextually relevant meaning, while in 
metaphor interpretation the literal meaning of the source domain shares 
some semantic properties with the intended, non-literal meaning. 
The case of metaphor interpretation is then similar to the polysemy 
case, where there is a semantic overlap between the semantic domains of the 
different literal meanings of a term. As in polysemy, metaphor interpretation 
is a context-sensitive pragmatic meaning-adjustment process whose result is 
an “ad hoc” concept (Carston 2002, 2010b, Vega Moreno 2004). To 
understand the sentence “Coffee is balm for the heart and the spirit” in the 
advertisement, we should modulate the term “balm” and the corresponding 
encoded concept:  
 
Coffee is balm for the heart and the spirit; 
Coffee is balm⋆ (“ad hoc” concept) for the heart and the spirit. 
 
Apparently, coffee is not a topical medical preparation, nor a repairing 
pomade for hair, but it shares other properties with balm, as for instance the 
properties of being relieving and restoring, and so on, according to the 
contextual use of the term “balm”. When many properties are shared, there 
is a wider semantic overlap between the two readings of the term “balm” 
(the literal meaning in e. and the non-literal one in f.).  
The pragmatic process involved is then similar to polysemy, 
especially in the case of dead (lexicalized) metaphors. Frequent use has 
brought them to a status similar to that of polysemous terms, i.e. literal 
terms. In dictionaries, these terms are classified as frequent uses of 
language, as modulations similar to the lexical entries of polysemous terms. 
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This is the reason dead metaphor comprehension requires linguistic 
knowledge of the ways the specific linguistic/cultural community uses the 
term. Consider the following example: 
 
Dead metaphors 
The term star has two different meanings, the literal meaning (7) and 
the non-literal meaning (8): 
celestial body;  
famous actor. 
 
Their semantic fields partially overlap for some properties: being bright, 
unachievable, etc. As in the case of polysemy, the two meanings have a 
semantic relation represented by the shared properties. The shared 
properties are so fixed in the cultural/linguistic knowledge of native 
speakers, and so well-established in their mental lexicon, that they are easily 
grasped even when just a sentential context is given. Moreover, dead 
metaphors often represent so widespread a schema of property associations 
that it is possible to find them in other languages and/or cultures, in exactly 
the same form (Bazzanella 2011, Handl 2011). For example, the English 
term “star” has a translation equivalent in Italian (as in “stella del cinema”) 
and in French (as in “étoile du spectacle”). 
The case of live metaphors is somewhat different from the case of 
lexicalized ones. In fact, metaphors from this class involve a completely 
new and creative use of language, not referable to a frequent use of language 
(and already classified in dictionaries). Consider the following example: 
 
Live metaphors 
The term dinner could have two different meanings, the literal meaning 
(9) and the non-literal meaning (10): 
evening meal of the day;  
(10) old age. 
 
Their semantic fields partially overlap for some properties, connected 
by the speaker in a new and creative way. This is the reason why live 
metaphor comprehension requires a more demanding effort to find out the 
shared properties intended by the speaker and a finer knowledge of the 
context and its features (Glucksberg and Estes 2000). Live metaphors 
usually appear in literary contexts and depend on a very deep understanding 
of the cultural-specific environment. This is the reason no well-established 
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schema or patterns of shared properties are found in other languages and/or 
cultures (Callies and Zimmermann 2002). 
The continuity among literal/non-literal uses of language is also 
testified to by the existence of a third case of metaphors, i.e. the class of 
moribund metaphors. The distinction dead/live metaphors faces some 
difficulties, involving, in some sense, the “death” and the “resurrection” of a 
metaphor. Lexicalization is indeed a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the death of metaphors, because: i) different dictionaries do not 
recognize the use, or ii) they could “come alive again”. An etymological 
criterion opens a vivid perspective in those cases. Consider the case of terms 
such as silly, pedigree, or daisy, whose origins trace back to middle and old 
English. Those terms possess meanings classified as literal, have a 
metaphoric etymological root! Literalization could then be the “real death” 
of a metaphor (Alm-Arvius 2003, 2006, Goatley 1997). These cases show 
that the process of literalization can follow three main directions. In the first 
case the corresponding literal meaning is dead, as in the case of the term 
“silly”, in the sense of deserving pity or sympathy, is an alteration of the 
dialect seely, happy, and later innocent, feeble. In a second case there is a 
fusion of a metaphorical compound at both a phonological and a semantic 
level; this is what happens with the term “daisy”, whose old English origin 
is dæges ēage, day’s eye, because the flower opens in the morning and 
closes at night. Finally, in the latter case, literalization could be due to 
translation or linguistic loan from another language, as for the term 
“pedigree”, whose origins are from late Middle English, from Anglo-
Norman French pé de grue ‘crane’s foot,’ a mark used to denote succession 
in pedigrees (Alm-Arvius 2006, Onions, Friedrichsen and Burchfield 
1966/1994). Therefore, differences among cases are somehow blemished 
and seem a matter of degree. In some sense, against the classical view, we 
could speak of a literal/non-literal continuum instead of a literal/non-literal 
divide. 
5. Quaternio terminorum understanding  
As noted above, the fallaciousness of quaternio terminorum stems from a 
semantic ambiguity of the middle term, which assumes distinct meanings in 
the two premises. Of course, such ambiguity may depend on different types 
of reasons. Namely, the middle term could be ambiguous because either it is 
a homonym, or polysemic, or else metaphoric. Moreover, our term could be 
metaphoric in two ways: either lexicalized, or living. So, the context of the 
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quaternio terminorum is absolutely appropriate, from our point of view, for 
investigating the degrees of the persuasiveness of an argument as the middle 
term varies through such a spectrum. 
The nuances of literal meaning and the various cases of metaphor 
explored could influence the ways we understand an argument and, in 
particular, quaternio terminorum, which is exactly based on the intrinsic 
ambiguity of the middle term. To identify the fallacy of quaternio 
terminorum, we should disambiguate the middle term, which means 
something in the first premise and something else in the second one. 
Disambiguating a homonymous middle term would require suppressing one 
of its two literal meanings, the irrelevant one (Gernsbacher 1990). 
Quaternio terminorum comprehension requires then the suppression of one 
of the two meanings in the first premise and vice versa in the second 
premise. However, middle terms might be lexically ambiguous in many 
ways: for instance, middle terms used in a metaphorical sense have 
figurative meanings that depart from their literal ones. How might quaternio 
terminorum comprehension be when metaphors are involved?  
In order to answer this question, we should understand how the 
different pragmatic processes discussed up to now influence the detection 
and the comprehension of the fallacy. We could hypothesize that quaternio 
terminorum comprehension should mainly depend on the nature of the 
middle term, and therefore on the corresponding cognitive-pragmatic 
process required to disambiguate the two meanings and to the degree of 
partial semantic overlap created by the different readings of a middle term 
(degree of shared semantic properties). Arguments, having the structure of 
quaternio terminorum, could contain either a lexically ambiguous or a 
metaphorical middle term. Moreover, some arguments could contain 
homonymous or polysemous middle terms (i.e. having two literal meanings) 
and other arguments could have middle terms corresponding to lexicalized 
or live metaphors (i.e. having a literal meaning and a non-literal meaning). 
There could be then at least four groups of middle terms, classified as 
follows: homonymy (H), polysemy (P), dead (lexicalized) metaphor (DM), 
live metaphor (LM). From now on, with H, P, DM, and LM, we shall denote 
the classes of arguments containing homonymous terms, polysemous terms, 
dead (lexicalized) metaphors, and live metaphors, respectively. Examples of 
quaternio terminorum (true premises/false conclusion) with H, P, DM and 
LM are the following: 
 
H Example: 
[P1] Banco di Sardegna is a bank; 
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[P2] A bank is a financial institution; 
[C] Banco di Sardegna is a financial institution. 
 
P Example: 
[P1] L is a letter; 
[P2] A letter is written; 
[C] L is written. 
 
DM Example: 
[P1] Clooney is a star; 
[P2] A star is a celestial body; 
[C] Clooney is a celestial body. 
 
LM Example: 
[P1] The old age is a dinner; 
[P2] A dinner is quite long; 
[C] The old age is quite long. 
 
Disambiguating a homonymous word like “bank” would involve the 
selection of one of its two meanings, i.e. financial institution or riverside 
(Gernsbacher 1990, Gernsbacher and Faust 1991). Processing the lexical 
form “bank” requires the activation of two different and unrelated lexical 
entries, and the suppression of the irrelevant one. As recently shown (Rubio 
Fernandez 2007), there is indeed a mechanism of suppression, which seems 
to operate faster in the resolution of lexical ambiguity than in dead 
metaphor, for the suppression of metaphor-inconsistent information. 
Therefore we expect different processes of quaternio terminorum 
understanding: we do expect that arguments containing homonymous words 
(e.g. “bank”) as middle terms will be more readily recognized fallacious 
than arguments containing dead metaphor words (e.g. “star”) as middle 
terms.  
We expect to find a difference in the processing of arguments 
containing polysemous words (e.g. “letter”) as the middle term too. Several 
recent psycholinguistic studies investigating the processing of polysemy and 
homonymy have indeed pointed out a differential representation of 
homonymy and polysemy (Frazier and Rayner 1990, Williams 1992, 
Pickering and Frisson 2001, Klepousniotou 2002, 2007, Beretta, Fiorentino, 
and Poeppel 2005, Klepousniotou, Titone, and Romero 2008, Brown 2008). 
In particular, Beretta, Fiorentino, and Poeppel (2005) empirically supported 
the single entry account of polysemy and the separate entries account for 
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homonymy, and Klepousniotou, Titone and Romero (2008) suggested that 
the degree of sense relatedness of polysemous words influences their 
processing. We do expect that this difference in homonymy and polysemy 
processing influences the disambiguation of the middle terms and thus the 
comprehension of the overall quaternio terminorum. 
Moreover, we suppose that the comprehension of arguments with live 
metaphors (e.g. “dinner”) as middle terms will be slightly different. This is 
because live metaphor comprehension involves elaborated pragmatic 
processes – as for instance iconic representations of concepts or imagery 
(Rubio Fernandez 2005, Carston 2010c, Indurkhya 2007). Understanding a 
live metaphor is an extremely context-dependent action, involving a full 
perception of the intended meaning of the entire statement (Lai, Curran, 
Menn 2009). It has indeed been argued that additional semantic information 
coming from the context may produce more stable representations, i.e. an 
advantage called “context availability effect” (Schwanenflugel, 
Harnishfeger and Stowe 1988, Glucksberg and Estes 2000). Therefore, our 
hypothesis is that the disambiguation of an argument whose middle term is a 
live metaphor should be definitely dependent on the broadness of the 
context provided. In contrast, a narrower context would be sufficient for the 
case of dead metaphors, because of their high familiarity and frequency. As 
already experimentally proved, “the amount of attentional resources 
involved in interpreting a metaphorical expression would be determined by 
the combination of these two factors: the degree of familiarity of the 
metaphorical interpretation and the strength of the contextual bias” (Rubio 
Fernandez 2007: 366). 
6. Literal and non-literal truths 
A preliminary study on the role of metaphors in quaternio terminorum 
comprehension (Ervas, Gola, Ledda and Sergioli 2012) shows that the 
majority of sentences with dead metaphors (83%) are perceived as true, 
even though they are literally false, whilst the majority of sentences with 
live metaphors (79%) are perceived as false, even though they are non-
literally true. How could these preliminary data be interpreted?  
According to the classical pragmatic view (Grice 1989, Camp 2004), 
sentence e. would be literally false, because of the literal, conventional 
meaning of “balm”. Metaphor is indeed an implicature generated by the 
flawing of the maxim of Quality: “Do not say what you believe to be false”. 
In Grice’s view, the fact that coffee is balm is “patently false”, so the 
  
 
 
 
 
Ervas & Ledda: Metaphors in Quaternio Terminorum Comprehension 
191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interpreter should find another possible, implicit meaning that better fits the 
context. In a similar way, Searle summarized the interpretive procedure in 
this way: “where an utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an 
utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning” (Searle 1985: 105). 
However, this thesis seems to be “an old wives’ tale”: as Joseph Stern noted, 
“we now recognize the prevalence of twice-true (Cohen 1976) and twice-apt 
(Hills 1997) metaphors and, in general, the explanatory vacuity of what we 
might call the “literal deviance” thesis (Stern 1983; cf. also White 2001)” 
(Stern 2006: 249-250). 
According to Contextualism and Relevance Theory (Recanati 2004, 
2010, Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, Wilson and Carston 2006, Carston 
2002), there is instead no literal meaning in people’s head: when they read a 
sentence containing a metaphor, people usually assign intuitive truth 
conditions to the sentence, thus directly modulating the metaphorical term 
and considering the sentence containing it as true, or at least plausible. The 
“falsehood” of metaphor is then seen as a “myth” (Scheffler 1988) and as a 
tendency to judge metaphor with some kind of truth conditions, the literal 
ones, that cannot explain the very nature of metaphor itself (Clark 1994). 
According to the classical view, the principle of compositionality is applied 
to the conventional meaning of the constituents of a sentence, whilst 
according to the contextualistic view, the principle of compositionality is 
applied to the already modulated meaning of the constituents of a sentence 
(Recanati 2010). Therefore, the outcomes of compositionality are expected 
to be possibly different. 
In particular, relevance scholars question the psychological plausibility 
of previous theoretical hypotheses, putting forth the “tribunal of experience” 
of Gricean philosophy of language (Noveck and Sperber 2004). They 
argued in favour of a difference between truth conditions of a sentence and 
the intuitive truth conditions assigned by a speaker in contextual uses of 
language. It is well known that Grice did not intend to explain these 
phenomena in terms of actual psychological processes. His theory is 
normative and has no psychological aims. His view of metaphor as an 
implicature directly came from his argumentative conception of rationality 
(concerning the whys of human linguistic behaviour), rather than the 
instrumental conception of rationality (concerning the hows of human 
linguistic behaviour) used by relevance scholars. Some scholars (Verbrugge 
and McCarrell 1977, Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos 1978, Janus 
and Bever 1985) have anyway used his theory to predict a two-stage process 
of metaphors: according to the account of meaning comprehension known 
as the “literal first hypothesis”, literal meanings are processed first, faster, 
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and more easily than figurative meanings. The process of understanding 
figurative language is indirect because it is necessarily dependent on a 
previous literal interpretation and would take longer than the understanding 
literal language exactly because of this previous mandatory step.  
The “direct access view” argued instead that understanding figurative 
language, such as metaphor, does not necessarily imply the literal 
interpretation mandatory step supposed by the “literal-first hypothesis” 
(Gibbs 1994, 2001, Gibbs and Gerrig 1989, Glucksberg 2003). 
Experimental findings have shown that reaction times for the understanding 
of utterances containing metaphors are not always longer than reaction 
times for the understanding of literal utterances (Gildea and Glucksberg 
1983, Glucksberg 2001). In fact, understanding depends on the salience and 
frequency of the metaphors used, or in other words, on their being dead or 
live (Giora 2003, Gibbs 1994). In this perspective, metaphors can no longer 
be explained in terms of an implicature arousing after the comprehension of 
literal meaning. 
Appealing to a “unified approach” to literal and non-literal uses of 
language, the process of modulation has been proposed by Carston (2002) 
and Recanati (2004, 2010) among others to explain not only the cases of 
polysemy but also metaphors. On the literalist side, it has been claimed that 
the ad hoc concept mechanism produces a non-controlled proliferation of 
interpretations: “the pragmatic operation of loosening over-generates 
metaphorical interpretations, differences of interpretation that are not 
reflected in our intuitive judgments” (Stern 2006: 255; cf. Stern 2000; 
Stanley 2002). They also criticized the contextualistic side because the same 
solution, the ad hoc concept mechanism, seems to be adopted for all “loose 
uses” of language, all kinds of metaphors included, without paying attention 
to the specific differences of all those phenomena and thus losing 
explicative power. 
Robyn Carston partially answered this kind of criticism by 
distinguishing different processing in the class of metaphors. Metaphors 
would still be explained as a local, on-line pragmatic adjustment of the 
encoded lexical meaning resulting in an ad hoc concept. However, in the 
case of live metaphors, an alternative, “imaginative” route is hypothesized 
(Carston 2010, Carston and Wearing 2011): the literal meaning would not 
be suppressed; it would be maintained in a more global pragmatic process 
resulting in a range of communicated affective and imagistic effects. This 
hypothesis has been confirmed by experimental studies, which showed that 
in the process of metaphor interpretation, the corresponding literal meaning 
is not suppressed straightforward (Glucksberg, Newsome and Go1dvarg 
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2001, Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner 2001, Rubio Fernandez 
2005, 2007) and remains to evoke further imagistic effects: “images are not 
communicated but are activated or evoked when certain lexical concepts are 
accessed and may be further imaginatively developed (by, for instance, 
shifting mental focus or perspective, zooming in on detail, or forming a 
connected dynamic sequence) as the conceptual content of the utterance is 
recovered” (Carston 2010c: 319). This “second route” to understanding 
metaphors does not exclude the ad hoc concepts mechanisms, i.e. a more 
conceptual way to metaphor understanding. However, the literal meaning 
endures in evoking an image with more important effect with respect to the 
first route. In Carston’s view, literal meaning plays a fundamental role for 
metaphor understanding. In the same vein, but on the non-contextualist side, 
Stern noted: “No account of metaphor will be adequate without explaining 
the fact that something about the meaning of the literal vehicle remains 
active in metaphorical interpretation” (Stern 2006: 250). 
However the main difference between the contextualist and the non-
contextualist views is exactly on the nature of literal meaning and its 
contribution to the truth conditions of a sentence. According to the 
contextualists’ view, the pragmatic process involved in dead metaphor 
comprehension takes the encoded concept and generates an “ad hoc” 
concept in the proposition the speaker intends to communicate, i.e. a 
proposition corresponding to the intuitive truth-conditions assigned by 
speakers. They assign thus the intuitive truth-conditions to the explicit 
proposition, respecting speakers’ semantic intuitions: understanding a 
statement means knowing the concrete circumstances of its truth (Carston 
2002). The contribution of a metaphor to the overall truth-condition of a 
sentence is then its intuitive truth-conditions, which is already done in the 
modulation process. This could be the reason why speakers judged most 
sentences containing a dead metaphor as true. Live metaphors instead would 
imply too complicated a process and contextual information given in a 
sentence would be too narrow to produce the desired imagistic effect. 
However, on the non-contextualist side, it could be claimed that dead 
metaphors are just perceived as true because they are lexicalised, similar to 
the case of literal meanings, such as in polysemy. Proper, live metaphors are 
still perceived as false, as the classical view stated (Grice 1989). 
Live metaphors might also be perceived as true when a broader context 
is presented. Experimental literature has shown that the interpretation 
process of novel metaphors diverges from conventional metaphors (Blasko 
and Connine 1993, Thibodeau and Durgin 2008), and because of the 
unfamiliarity with live metaphors, more context is needed to understand 
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them. A broader context is indeed useful to identify the relevant properties 
of the literal meaning used on a specific occasion. However, if aristotelic 
standards of syllogisms are respected, in argumentative contexts such as 
those represented by the concatenation of premises/conclusion in a 
quaternio terminorum, live metaphors have a very narrow context in which 
to be interpreted. This could be the reason why they are usually interpreted 
as literally false and thus they should not be problematic for the 
comprehension of the (in)correctness of the overall argument. In our view, 
there is indeed a link between the evaluation of the premises’ truth 
conditions and the overall comprehension of the correctness of the whole 
argument. In a narrow context, dead metaphors are instead perceived as true 
even though they are literally false. The encyclopaedic knowledge linked to 
the everyday use of our mother language is sufficient to recognize the 
relevant properties carried by the conventional metaphor and a broader 
context is not necessarily required (Glucksberg and Estes 2000). The case of 
lexicalized metaphors is indeed very interesting because, as experimental 
literature testifies, they are processed as fast as literal meanings (Giora 
2003), and people had difficulty in rejecting metaphors as literally false 
(Glucksberg 2003), even though they remain figurative meanings and 
literally false as such. This might be the reason why “common”, dead 
metaphors make the arguments more persuasive than others. It is plausible 
that difficulties in attributing literal or non-literal truth conditions to 
premises containing metaphoric ambiguity influence the detection of the 
(in)correctness of the whole argument, as in case of quaternio terminorum. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The core idea of the present article can be captured by two simple questions: 
 
1. How much can metaphors influence the truth-condition perception 
of a statement? 
 
2. How much can the type of ambiguity of a term influence the 
perception of the soundness of an argument? 
 
In order to answer those questions, we discussed the main features of lexical 
ambiguity in both its literal forms (e.g. homonymy and polysemy) and non-
literal forms (e.g. dead and live metaphors), arguing in favour of an 
“ambiguity spectrum” which could influence the perception of an argument, 
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such as quaternio terminorum, when the middle term is ambiguous. We 
discussed the pragmatic processes involved in lexical ambiguity and 
metaphor comprehension, focusing our attention on the experimental 
literature showing the ways disambiguation and metaphor interpretation 
work. We then proposed our hypotheses on the comprehension mechanism 
of sentences, such as premises of quaternio terminorum, containing such 
ambiguous terms. Also, we discussed some preliminary results of an 
empirical study (Ervas, Gola, Ledda and Sergioli 2012), designed to 
measure the influence of lexical ambiguity and metaphor on quaternio 
terminorum understanding. To answer the first question, we discussed the 
preliminary outcomes which reveal, up to now, that most sentences with 
dead metaphors are considered true; while a large proportion of the 
sentences containing live metaphors are perceived as false. To answer the 
second question, we hypothesized that these results should have an 
influence in the perception of the soundness and persuasiveness of the 
overall argument, making a difference for arguments containing dead versus 
live metaphors. 
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Introduction 
In what follows, I intend to provide an indirect approach to a few 
epistemological issues raised by the wide use made in philosophy of 
figurative language in general, and of metaphors in particular. One of the 
many consequences of the progressive dismissal of the original logical-
empiricist program, and of the corresponding disillusionment concerning the 
possibility of drawing a clear-cut distinction between literal and figurative 
language
2
, has certainly been the explicit acknowledgement of the 
fundamental cognitive role played by metaphors within our intellectual life 
as a whole. The view according to which metaphor, far from being a mere 
stylistic device used mainly for rhetorical purposes, should be thought of as 
deeply and essentially entrenched in human thought processes has indeed 
become increasingly popular during the second half of the last century. “Our 
ordinary conceptual system”, some have gone as far as claiming, “is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3). The 
                                                 
1
  These considerations are the result of stimulating conversations had with Pierluigi 
Graziani, Massimo Sangoi, and Vincenzo Fano, to all of whom goes a special thank. 
Thanks also to the two anonymous referee, whose valuable comments contributed to 
improve the initial draft of this paper. 
2
  The separation between figurative and literal seems to be deeply rooted in western 
culture, and can be traced back as far as Aristotle. See Johnson (1981: 6). Amongst the 
contemporary approaches to metaphor which deny the existence of a clear-cut distinction 
between literal and figurative uses of language, it may be worth mentioning Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, Hesse 1993, and Sperber and Wilson 2008. 
